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## I.—HORACE, SERM. I 4: A PROTEST AND A PROGRAMME.

Mr. Furness, in the preface to his edition of *Othello*, has quoted a passage from the lectures of the Edinburgh anatomist, Dr. Barclay, which by its frank avowal seems as if written to ease the heart of the late-born classical student who essays to present new points of view concerning the work of an author to whom such long and such devoted study has been given as to Horace. Like Dr. Barclay's anatomists, so our heroic scholars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are "the reapers, who entering upon untrodden ground, cut down great store of corn from all sides of them. . . . Then come the gleaners who gather up ears enough from the bare ridges to make a few loaves of bread. Last of all come the geese, who still continue to pick up a few grains scattered here and there among the stubble, and waddle home in the evening, poor things, cackling with joy because of their success." If the illustration seem to any one too apt for prudence, he may derive comfort from the assurances of the anatomical specialists, that anatomy had not so nearly exhausted its field at the beginning of the present century as the good Dr. Barclay believed. But still it is apposite enough to justify the scepticism of any audience asked to listen to a new interpretation of a whole poem of Horace. It is therefore with some hesitation that I venture to advance an explanation of the meaning and purpose of the composition named in my title at variance with current opinion—an explanation which, if sound, is not without significance for the

whole question of Horace's relation to Lucilius and to the history and theory of satire.<sup>1</sup>

In the second poem of the first book, the earliest specimen of the poet's work in this field which he allowed to survive, it is clear that Horace had undertaken to write satire in the tradition of the form established by Lucilius. It reveals a coarseness and a freedom of speech essentially analogous to the manner of his great predecessor. As yet Horace was a free lance in Roman society, unembarrassed by important friendships and unconcerned for possible enmities. But after all, coarseness and cynicism were not the natural expression of his nature, which was gentle and refined, and it is probable that the force of literary tradition led him to forms of expression and criticism which violated his own inclinations and tendencies.<sup>2</sup>

In the third poem of this book Horace has freed himself from any constraint of the tradition of satire, and with a growing independence, based upon his own nature and the confidence inspired by influential friendships, he presents as a satirist a wholly different front. In this work he begins, to be sure, in the censorious manner of satire, with a review of the character of Tigellius, but passes at once to a sharp censure of such ill-natured criticism, making his own example the text of a plea for kindly tolerance of the faults of others, which shall err rather on the side of indulgence.<sup>3</sup> The tone and spirit of this composition are as much at

<sup>1</sup> A complete presentation of my view involves a treatment of portions of Serm. I 10 also, which will appear in a subsequent number of this Journal.

<sup>2</sup> An interesting analogy is the statement of Cicero that the *reprehensio vitae*, in the prosecution of Murena (II), *ita fuit infirma et levis, ut illos lex magis quaedam accusatoria quam vera male dicendi facultas* de vita L. Murenæ dicere aliquid *coegerit*. In verse 65 ff. of the fourth satire Horace compares the satirist as usually thought of to the prosecutor (see below, p. 131).

<sup>3</sup> Nothing can be weaker than the current interpretation of the old puzzle in vs. 20 *et fortasse minora*, which admonishes the reader that the emphasis lies on *fortasse*, i. e. 'perhaps less, *perhaps* also greater.' One need not wonder, therefore, that Hertz and L. Müller have gone back to Aldus' once popular conjecture, *haud fortasse*. But *et* is right and perfectly clear if the whole connection is grasped. Horace begins in a censorious vein of petty personal criticism. When upbraided with the question *quid? tu || nullane habes vitia?* still playing the rôle of critic, he replies in feeble self-apology, *et fortasse minora*. The situation is relieved of all uncertainty by the illustration which follows. Maenius (who corresponds to Horace) assails the absent Novius (who plays the rôle of Tigellius), and when reproved by some one present, answers in weak defence, *egomet mi ignosco*, which in turn is the equivalent of *et fortasse*

variance with the tradition of satire established by Lucilius and with Horace's first essay as can well be imagined. The personal allusions too, so far as can be determined, are rather literary than real. Thus near the beginning of the poet's career we see him repenting of the tone which his first work had assumed and repudiating the function which criticism had assigned to this branch of composition.

That brings us to the fourth satire, in which, apparently, the poet feels obliged to defend himself against the numerous enmities his verse had made. Kirchner, in accordance with the usual interpretation, entitles his translation "the poet's justification," and Kiessling says (Introduction) that Horace defends himself, on the one hand, against those who denied to satire the character of true poetry, by showing that Lucilius and himself derived their spirit from the inspired old comedy; and, on the other hand, against the philistinism of the day, which felt itself assailed by his satire, and therefore hated the satirist. Now, as we have seen, Horace had written one poem which might have given rise to some such feelings. But we shall find it hard to believe that this one composition of an author hitherto unknown should have succeeded in arousing such bitter hatred as we must assume was the case, if we are to interpret the hostile criticism which the poem reflects as directed against Horace in person. This and other related difficulties were felt by Kirchner, and accordingly (Einl., p. 15, vol. I), contrary to the generally accepted conclusions of scholars before and since his time, he placed this and the related tenth satire after all the other compositions of this book, and after the third of book two. That Kirchner was in error in advancing the date of composition so far scarcely requires proof. But he deserves credit for observing that this satire, as usually interpreted, is hardly conceivable near the beginning of the poet's career.

We have already seen that in the third poem Horace has revealed a nature of kindly tolerance and has raised a protest against carping criticism of personal faults and peculiarities. It

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*minora*. The vigorous censure which follows—*stultus et improbus hic amor est dignusque notari*—is aimed primarily at Horace's own apology, although attached immediately to the apology of Maenius. Vss. 1-24 give an objective example of the carping criticism against which the remainder of the satire is directed. The observation that *et fortasse minora* and *egomet mi ignosco* must correspond, quite excludes the reading *haud fortasse*.

shows how little sympathy he must have had with the conception of satire which prevailed among his contemporaries. This conception is known to us from other sources, and is formulated in the definition preserved by Diomedes (G. L. I, p. 485), derived from a source certainly as early as Varro: *carmen maledicum ad carpenda vitia hominum archaiae comoediae caractere compositum*. It was therefore not unnatural that, finding himself pursuing a form of composition in a spirit at variance with the traditions of its character, its origin, and the practice of his predecessors, he should at an early stage in his work turn his attention to the theory of satire current in his time, and declare his attitude toward it. This he does in the present poem, the first part of which is a protest against the traditional idea of the character and function of satire, while the second part sets forth his own conception of his task. I do not believe that Horace is here justifying himself before the harsh criticisms of a public which felt aggrieved and injured by his attacks, nor do I believe that the contents of the satire and the criticisms of himself which it presents are drawn from life. *It is, on the contrary, a criticism of literary theory put concretely*. The charges of an imaginary critic, describing Horace as an envenomed and unsparing satirist—in terms such as literary criticism employed concerning Lucilius or Aristophanes—give the poet opportunity to utter his protest against this character which tradition had attributed to satire. His positive programme is touched on but lightly. It is drawn throughout with conspicuous antithesis to the qualities which were attributed to Lucilius or to the idea of satire as abstracted from his career. Before approaching the detailed analysis, let me remind the reader that it will not be admissible to quote the first satire of the second book against the results which have been thus outlined; for Horace, in the face of literary and social success, was able to be much more generous with Lucilius and more tolerant of his admirers than we find him here and in the tenth poem of this book.

I have called the first part of this poem a protest against the prevalent conception of satire and the character thus attributed to the satirist. This is the central theme, and is defined by the poet very sharply in vs. 64: *nunc illud tantum quaeram, meritone tibi sit || suspectum genus hoc scribendi*. His object is to show, in the first place, why this suspicion is entertained, and, in the second place, to disclaim the applicability of such a conception of satire

to himself and to his work as he proposes to practice it. He begins, therefore, with the history of satire as literary critics of his time and before him had defined it,<sup>1</sup> and thus explains why *genus hoc minime iuvat* (vs. 24).

Eupolis atque Cratinus Aristophanesque poetae  
atque alii, quorum comoedia prisca virorum est,  
siquis erat dignus describi, quod malus ac fur,  
quod moechus foret aut sicarius aut alioqui  
5 famosus, multa cum libertate notabant.

Here it will be observed that the old comedy is characterized, not in all of its manifestations, but only in those which made it the dreaded scourge of evil-doers in its day (cf. treatise *περὶ κωμῳδίας* V (Dübner), v. 21 ff.). When Horace continues, therefore,

Hinc omnis pendet Lucilius, hosce secutus  
mutatis tantum pedibus numerisque, facetus,  
emunctae naris, durus componere versus,

we are only justified in interpreting these words to mean that Lucilius is the faithful disciple of the writers of the old comedy in this one respect, viz. aggressive, censorious wit. That we may not infer more from this passage is made clear from the fact that further on in this poem, and also in I. 10, Horace emphasizes the failure of Lucilius to reproduce some other desirable elements of the old comedy, and thus fell short of his model and short of the ideal. For Aristophanes and his compeers were poets (vs. 1); Lucilius is not (vs. 57). The old comedy was strong in playful jest as well as cutting wit (I 10, 11 and 17); Lucilius has only the latter. While, to be sure, he is praised for that (*quod sale multo || urbem defricuit . . . laudatur*, I 10, 4), still Horace says expressly in that connection *nec tamen hoc tribuens dederim quoque cetera* (ib. 5).<sup>2</sup> It is therefore essential to keep in mind that Horace here means to limit sharply Lucilius' indebtedness to the old comedy to that quality which made Cratinus and Aristophanes feared and hated in their time, and which, as practised by Lucilius, had caused people to look with suspicion and fear upon satire. It will now be clear why Horace begins as he does: the old comedy

<sup>1</sup> That the association of Lucilius with the old comedy antedates Horace (contrary to the view of Kiessling and others) Leo has made clear, Varro und die Satire, Hermes, vol. 24 (1889), p. 67 ff. Additional evidence to the same effect from Horace himself I shall adduce in connection with Serm. I 10, 17.

<sup>2</sup> On this point see further the detailed interpretation of I 10 init.

was conspicuous for its aggressive, relentless wit; Lucilius followed it in this respect, and hence from that time all who call themselves satirists are regarded with suspicion. But the connection between the history of satire and the conclusion, *sunt quos genus hoc minime iuvat* (vs. 24), is obscured by the digression on the style of Lucilius, which Horace introduces apropos of the words *durus componere versus*.

Nam fuit hoc vitiosus: in hora saepe ducentos,  
 10 ut magnum, versus dictabat stans pede in uno;  
 cum flueret lutulentus, erat quod tollere velles;  
 garrulus atque piger scribendi ferre laborem,  
 scribendi recte, nam ut multum nil moror. Ecce  
 Crispinus minimo me provocat 'accipe, si vis,  
 15 accipiam tabulas; detur nobis locus, hora,  
 custodes, videamus uter plus scribere possit.'

This censure is very sharp, for not only must Lucilius bear the brunt of what Horace puts upon him directly, but also the odium of the comparison with the prolific Crispinus. And we may well believe that Horace, in contemplating the thirty muddy books of his predecessor, could say with grateful heart

Di bene fecerunt, inopis me quodque pusilli  
 finxerunt animi, raro et perpauca loquentem.  
 At tu conclusas hircinis follibus auras  
 20 usque laborantis, dum ferrum molliat ignis,  
 ut mavis, imitare.

But in alluding to the form of Lucilius, Horace has digressed from his main purpose, though not without design and implied contrast of his own ideal of careful execution. He now returns to his argument with the insertion of another comparison.

Beatus Fannius ultro  
 delatis capsis et imagine, cum mea nemo  
 scripta legat, volgo recitare timentis ob hanc rem,  
 quod sunt quos genus hoc minime iuvat, utpote pluris  
 25 culpari dignos.

The transition is made abrupt by the familiar Horatian inversion which places an illustration or a comparison before that which it is meant to illustrate, and gives it independent form, as if a thing adduced for its own sake.<sup>1</sup> But the connection may be traced

<sup>1</sup>The observation of this habit affords the explanation of many seemingly disconnected parts of the *Ars Poetica*.

easily thus: Lucilius wrote too much, and the challenge to vie with him I must reject, as I do that of the prolific Crispinus. And, thank heaven, I speak but little and not often; and that little no one reads, since I would not proffer my books to be read, as the complacent Fannius does, and I am afraid to recite them myself, *quod genus hoc* etc.

Quemvis media elige turba  
aut ob avaritiam aut misera ambitione laborat;  
hic nuptarum insanit amoribus, hic puerorum;  
hunc capit argenti splendor, stupet Albius aere;  
hic mutat mercis surgente a sole ad eum, quo  
30 vespertina tepet regio, quin per mala praeceps  
fertur, uti pulvis collectus turbine, nequid  
summa deperdat metuens aut ampliet ut rem:  
omnes hi metuunt versus, odere poetas.

They think of the satirist as a harsh and unsparing wit who uses the weapons of invective and personal abuse to make conspicuous any one whom his fancy strikes.

‘Faenum habet in cornu, longe fuge: dummodo risum  
35 excutiat tibi, non hic cuiquam parcet amico  
et quodcumque semel chartis inleverit, omnis  
gestiet a furno redeuntis scire lacuque  
et pueros et anus.’

But why is this opinion held? Has Horace in fact been so unsparing in his attacks that he has provoked the whole city to fear and hate? Obviously not, and I have said enough to make it clear that these words are only a concrete picture of the general conception of satire itself as already formulated in the poet's time, to combat which is the object of this composition. Accordingly, this description is only a somewhat exaggerated form of language actually applied to the slashing wit of the old comedy (and its precursors, the early iambic poets) or the unsparing spirit of Lucilius. The humorous description of the satirist as an infuriated bull was conventional in this sphere of literature, as we may conjecture from Horace's comparison of himself to Archilochus (in Epod. 6, 11): *in malos asperrimus || parata tollo cornua, || qualis Lycambae spretus infido gener*.<sup>1</sup> To the same class belongs the warning to flee the poet, as armed with dangerous

<sup>1</sup> The same comparison underlies the choice of the illustration in Serm. II 1, 52: *dente lupus, cornu taurus petit*. Similarly *dens*; cf. Epod. 6, 15: *atro dente*, and Persius (of Lucilius) 1, 115: *et genuinum fregit in illis*.



weapons.<sup>1</sup> The satirist thus armed and an object of terror may remind us of Juvenal's perfervid picture (I 165): *ense velut stricto quotiens Lucilius ardens || infremuit* etc., or of the attacks of Cratinus ὥσπερ δημοσία μάστιξ (π. κωμ. V). In the words *dummodo risum || excutiat tibi non hic cuiquam parcet amico* Horace has reproduced a statement of the ungentlemanly or illiberal form of jest as defined by Aristotle, who illustrated such witticism by the example of the old comedy. For the satirist, as Horace finds that people conceive of him, is none other than the coarse and inconsiderate βωμολόχος whom Aristotle describes (Eth. Nic. IV 14, 1128a36): οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος, εἰ γέλωτα ποιήσει. The difference, he continues, between the jest of the βωμολόχος and the εὐτράπελος is such as would distinguish the jest of a slave from that of a gentleman, or of an uncultivated man from that of a cultivated man. The former is illustrated by the old comedy, in which the means of provoking laughter is αἰσχρολογία (coarseness and abuse), the latter by the new comedy, where the effect is produced by ὑπόνοια (innuendo). Later special writers περὶ γελοίου<sup>2</sup> defined more accurately the proper limits of jest, following the general lines of Aristotle's treatment. So, for example, in Cicero (De orat. II 237) we find that the Aristotelian οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος has been given a special application: *parcendum maxime est caritati hominum, ne temere in eos dicas qui diliguntur*, or as he says again in the Orator, 89: *parcet amicitiiis*, which approaches our verse most closely—*non hic cuiquam parcet amico*. Again, in contrast to the εἴρων, whose jest is for his own amusement, the βωμολόχος seeks some ulterior aim of abuse or defamation: ἔστι δὲ ἡ εἰρωνεία τῆς βωμολοχίας ἐλευθεριώτερον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα ποιεῖ τὸ γελοῖον, ὁ δὲ βωμολόχος ἑτέρου (Rhet. III 18 ad fin.). So here Horace causes the satirist to be described as not content till the very children of the streets have heard his outpourings. We see, therefore, that the picture which Horace draws of the satirist, as people think of him, corresponds to Aristotle's characterization of the βωμολοχία which he found exemplified by the old comedy, and to such terms as are used to describe iambic and satirical poets generally.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the epigram on Hipponax (Anthol. Pal. VII 405): ὦ ξεῖνε φεῦγε τὸν χαλαζεπῇ τάφον || τὸν φρικτὸν Ἰππώνακτος.

<sup>2</sup> Whom Cicero makes use of in De orat. II 235 and refers to (*qui pollicerentur*).

- Agedum pauca accipe contra.
- Primum ego me illorum, dederim quibus esse poetas,  
 40 excerpam numero; neque enim concludere versum  
 dixeris esse satis neque, siqui scribat uti nos  
 sermoni propiora, putes hunc esse poetam;  
 ingenium cui sit, cui mens diviniore atque os  
 magna sonaturum des nominis huius honorem,  
 45 Idcirco quidam, comoedia necne poema  
 esset, quaesivere quod acer spiritus ac vis  
 nec verbis nec rebus inest, nisi quod pede certo  
 differt sermoni, sermo merus. 'At pater ardens  
 saevit, quod meretrice nepos insanus amica  
 50 filius uxorem grandi cum dote recuset,  
 ebrius et magnum quod dedecus ambulet ante  
 noctem cum facibus.' Numquid Pomponius istis  
 audiret leviora, pater si viveret? ergo  
 non satis est puris versum perscribere verbis,  
 55 quem si dissolvas, quivis stomachetur eodem  
 quo personatus pacto pater. His, ego quae nunc,  
 olim quae scripsit Lucilius, eripias si  
 tempora certa modosque et quod prius ordine verbum est  
 posterius facias, praeponens ultima primis—  
 60 non ut si solvas 'postquam Discordia taetra  
 belli ferratos postis portasque refregit'—  
 invenias etiam disiecti membra poetae.

With these words the poet begins his rejoinder. To many scholars this episode has seemed a mere digressive quibble. That it is, however, a vital part of Horace's protest will, I think, appear. In the first place it is probable that Roman criticism of Lucilius, in emphasizing his relation to the old comedy, had (as we shall see further, on I 10, 12: *modo rhetoris atque poetae*) attributed to him poetical qualities which only belonged to the Attic masters with whom he was associated, and in other ways had exaggerated the poetical character of his work.<sup>1</sup> It is, I believe, against such a conception of the nature of satirical form that Horace here protests, affirming that so far from laying claim to the title of poet for himself, he expressly repudiates it. 'It is not enough to write mere prose in metrical feet to entitle one to that designation, and for the same reason some have questioned whether comedy was poetry or not.' The comedy referred to is not, of course, the *ἀρχαία*, as some interpreters have thought, misled by the allusions to this form at the beginning. It is

<sup>1</sup>Cf. L. Müller, *Leben und Werke d. G. Lucilius*, p. 20: "Lucilius nimmt zuweilen, öfter als Horaz, höheren dichterischen Schwung."

*comoedia* κατ' ἐξοχὴν, i. e. the *véa*, as the example plainly shows. In fact, as Horace desires to repudiate for himself association with the aggressive *spirit* of the old comedy, so in like manner he has entered into this discussion for the sake of repudiating all claim to the character of true poetry which such association would suggest, and which, apparently, criticism had attributed to Lucilius. He is therefore careful to say emphatically that the writers of the old comedy were poets—*Eupolis atque Cratinus Aristophanesque poetae*—for the sake of setting over against this his own disavowal. The old comedy possessed the *ingenium*, the *mens diviniór*, the *os magna sonaturum*<sup>1</sup> of true poetry—ἡ δὲ παλαιὰ (ἔχει) τὸ δεινὸν καὶ ὑψηλὸν τοῦ λόγου (π. κωμ. V, v. 7). Satire, on the other hand, like the new comedy (and the μέση), only aims to versify the language of everyday life.<sup>2</sup> In denying to Lucilius as well as to himself (vs. 57) the character of true poetry, we may discern (as I have already said) a criticism directed against those admirers of Lucilius who attributed to him the qualities of elevated poetry which they found in Aristophanes and Cratinus. They were poets, Horace says, I am not; no more was Lucilius, and his only relation to them is his emulation of their great license of speech.

<sup>1</sup> A point of detailed interpretation in passing. The editors, I believe, look upon these words (43) as an enumeration of three qualities essential to true poetry. Horace's thought, however, is this: poetry is a matter of genius (*ingenium*) which manifests itself (1) in the inspired thought (*mens diviniór*) and (2) in elevation of language (*os magna sonaturum*). It is the customary division of Greek literary criticism into the *τόπος πραγματικός* and *λεκτικός* (cf. Dion. Hal. de Dem., ch. 31 and passim). *Ingenium* belongs to and comprehends both. That the poet has this division in mind becomes obvious at vs. 47: quod acer spiritus ac vis || nec verbis (λέξεις) nec rebus (πράγματα) inest. On *os* in the meaning 'style' cf. Persius in allusion to this passage (v. p. 139), 5, 15: ore teres modico, and cf. the similar use of στόμα in Greek; e. g. Dion. Hal. de Lysia, ch. 15: τὸ Λυσιακὸν στόμα.

<sup>2</sup> There are some conspicuous points of analogy here to the Greek criticism of the middle and new comedy which are worth pointing out. For example, like Horace, the poets of the middle comedy did not aim at poetical invention: τῆς δὲ μέσης κωμωδίας οἱ ποιηταὶ πλάσματος μὲν οὐχ ἤψαντο ποιητικοῦ, διὰ δὲ τῆς συνήθους ἰόντες λαλιᾶς λογικὰς ἔχουσι τὰς ἀρετάς (neque . . . siqui scribat uti nos || sermoni propiora), ὥστε σπάνιον ποιητικὸν εἶναι χαρακτηῖρα παρ' αὐτοῖς (putes hunc esse poetam). Similarly Aristotle, in contrast to the high-flown, poetical language of the old comedy, demanded that the κωμικὴ λέξις should be κοινὴ καὶ δημώδης (Coislinian treatise π. κωμ., §7, and Bernays' comment, *Ergänzung zu Arist. Poetik*, p. 165).

- Hactenus haec: alias iustum sit necne poema.  
 Nunc illud tantum quaeram, meritone tibi sit  
 65 suspectum genus hoc scribendi. Sulcius acer  
 ambulat et Caprius, rauci male cumque libellis,  
 magnus uterque timor latronibus; at bene si quis  
 et vivat puris manibus, contemnat utrumque.  
 Ut sis tu similis Caeli Birrique latronum,  
 70 non ego sim Capri neque Sulci: cur metuas me?  
 Nulla taberna meos habeat neque pila libellos,  
 quis manus insudet volgi Hermogenisque Tigelli,  
 nec recito cuiquam nisi amicis idque coactus,  
 non ubivis coramve quibuslibet. In medio qui  
 75 scripta foro recitent sunt multi quique lavantes,  
 suave locus voci resonat conclusus. Inanis  
 hoc iuvat, haud illud quaerentis, num sine sensu,  
 tempore num faciant alieno.

With these words Horace reverts to his main theme. The idea that the satirist, *qua* satirist, can have but the one purpose of ill-natured criticism is again taken up and answered by a comparison. 'You seem to think of the writer of satire very much as the thief thinks of the zealous prosecutors Sulcius and Caprius. But the man with clean hands need not fear them; how much less then need you fear me, for, though you should take the rôle of thief, I disclaim that of prosecutor.' It was, of course, the career of Lucilius which gave form and currency to the conception of satire which the poet disavows. For Lucilius had been in his day nothing less than a public prosecutor—*primores populi arripuit populumque tributum* (II 1, 69) just to be sure (ib. 70), but with a keen scent (*emunctae naris*) to ferret out the wrong and to unmask it—*detrahere et pellem, nitidus qua quisque per ora || cederet, introrsum turpis* (II 1, 63). In this regard he followed closely the example of his Attic masters (π. κωμ. I, v. 35): σκοποῦ γὰρ ὄντος τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμῳδίας τοῦ σκώπτειν (*arripuit*) δῆμους (*populum tributum*) καὶ δικαστὰς καὶ στρατηγούς (*primores populi*). For this view of comedy as a beneficent factor in Athenian life see the treatises *passim* (e. g. V, v. 20). It is possible that from such sources the same claim of the performance of a public service had been transferred to Lucilius by Roman critics, and so had entered into the theory of satire. But, at all events, it is clearly opposed to the ideals and practice of Horace, and he makes use of the Roman hatred of the voluntary prosecutor to put this conception in an odious light.<sup>1</sup> So far from seeking out objects of attack or

<sup>1</sup> For the analogy of the task of the prosecutor to that of the satirist, see the interesting passage from Cicero quoted above, p. 122, note.

publicity for his work, his books are not on sale, nor does he read them to any but his friends, and to them only under compulsion.

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'Laedere gaudes'

inquit 'et hoc studio praevis facis.'

Resuming his main theme, the poet puts into the mouth of an imaginary enemy these words, descriptive of himself. But nowhere is it clearer that the purpose of the hostile criticism which Horace causes to be directed against himself is to characterize the satirist in the abstract, in accordance with the received theory of satire. For tradition and criticism had ruled that it is the function of satire to hurt, as it had been of the old comedy, which declined with the loss of this privilege—*turpiter obticuit sublato iure nocendi* (A. P. 284).<sup>1</sup> For satire this view is expressed in its most general form by Trebatius, who contrasts with it the worthier task of singing the deeds of Caesar: *quanto rectius hoc* (sc. *Caesaris res dicere*) *quam tristi laedere versu* etc. (II 1, 21). But it is an unworthy ambition of coarse wits (*βωμολόχοι*), as Aristotle had pointed out (l. c., 1128a6): *μᾶλλον στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ γέλωτα ποιεῖν ἢ τοῦ λέγειν εὐσχήμονα καὶ μὴ λυπεῖν (laedere, nocere) τὸν σκωπτόμενον*. Later criticism, however, not sharing Aristotle's hostility to the old comedy, and seeking to give theoretical justification to the coarse forms of wit it displayed, frankly recognized *βωμολοχία* as a merit in comic and iambic poetry.<sup>2</sup> So, for example, the Coislinian treatise *περὶ κωμωδίας*, putting as a requisite of comedy exactly what Aristotle condemned, says (Bernays, §5): *ὁ σκώπτων ἐλέγχειν θέλει ἀμαρτήματα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος*<sup>3</sup>—words which also

<sup>1</sup> *Turpiter* is, I think, to be taken with *nocendi*, i. e. (in language such as Aristotle might have used of the old comedy) *αἰσχρολογία λυπεῖν*. The position would associate it as naturally with *nocendi* as with *obticuit*. For the phraseology and thought, cf. Cic. De orat. II 236: *haec enim ridetur vel sola vel maxime, quae notant et designant turpitudinem non turpiter*. But this is an ideal standpoint which the old comedy did not live up to, and it was conspicuous for its freedom *notare turpiter*, or as here *nocere turpiter*.

<sup>2</sup> If this seem incredible to any one, let him remember that Horace himself, with certain limitations, concedes it (I 10, 8): *et est quaedam hic quoque virtus* (sc. *risu diducere rictum auditoris*). See further on p. 141.

<sup>3</sup> With this compare Cicero, De orat. II 239: *est etiam deformitatis et corporis vitiorum satis bella materies ad iocandum*—a statement which Cicero limits rather sharply, to be sure, but which, nevertheless, marks a retrogression from the standpoint of Aristotle. Cf. also p. 139.

illustrate *hoc studio facis* (θέλει, corresponding to Aristotle's στοχαζόμενοι).

To this accusation the poet replies:

Unde petitem

80 hoc in me iacis? est auctor quis denique eorum  
vixi cum quibus?

The charge of willful abuse is of course derived from the fact that he professes to write satire, and hence is assumed to wield the malignant weapons of a Lucilius or a Cratinus. But, he rejoins, you do wrong to condemn me in the general suspicion and hate with which you look on satire (*suspectum genus hoc scribendi*); nor could any one of my friends, who know my mind and my work, have said that I take pleasure in abuse.<sup>1</sup> But Horace allows his critic to go on and paint a still blacker picture of him in the words which follow:

‘Absentem qui rodit amicum,

qui non defendit alio culpante, solutos  
qui captat risus hominum famamque dicacis,  
fingere qui non visa potest, commissa tacere

85 qui nequit, hic niger est, hunc tu, Romane, caveto.’

This description is an amplification of the preceding *laedere gaudes*, and corresponds also to the description of the satirist given in vss. 34–38. The βωμολόχος, whose jest has some object beyond his own amusement, is seen in the words *solutos* || *qui captat risus hominum famamque dicacis*. Verse 85—*fingere qui non visa potest, commissa tacere*—is not meant, of course, in a merely general sense of one who will lie or betray a trust. It serves to delineate more fully the character of the man whose whole thought is bent on provoking laughter, for the sake of which he sacrifices the most fundamental virtues; he is lost to everything but his jest, and is the slave of laughter—ὁ βωμολόχος ἥττων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελόλου (Eth. Nic. IV 14, 1128a35).<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The question *est auctor quis denique eorum* || *vixi cum quibus* does not ask for information: it is a rhetorical form of negation.

<sup>2</sup> Editors are by no means agreed that these words are to be assigned to the *adversarius* whom Horace has introduced. But the view has gained ground since it was first advocated by H. Keck in 1856, and, unless I deceive myself, the course of my present argument proves the necessity of taking them out of the mouth of Horace. There is, however, concrete evidence that the poet intended them to be so understood, quite apart from what might be thought subjective considerations. The critic sums up his indictment with the phrase

Horace does not answer this sombre indictment directly, but proceeds to give two contrasting examples of freedom of speech, with the judgments which they call forth.

- Saepe tribus lectis videas cenare quaternos,  
 e quibus unus amet quavis adspargere cunctos  
 praeter eum qui praebet aquam; post hunc quoque potus,  
 condita cum verax aperit praecordia Liber.  
 90 Hic tibi comis et urbanus liberque videtur  
 infesto nigris. Ego si risi, quod ineptus  
 pastillos Rufillus olet, Gargonius hircum,  
 lividus et mordax videor tibi?

The slanderer in society goes unrebuked or is even praised for his loose tongue, while the poet is branded as vicious for a trifling jibe at two notorious asses. The reason for this difference Horace does not need to repeat, for he has already pointed out that the historical associations of satirical writing expose one who professes it to harsh judgment. The offence of Horace lies in the fact that this example, in spite of its harmlessness, is a specimen of *ὀνομαστὶ κωμῳδεῖν*, the dreaded weapon of Lucilius and the old comedy.

- Mentio siquae  
 de Capitolini furtis iniecta Petilli  
 95 te coram fuerit, defendas, ut tuus est mos:  
 'me Capitolinus convictore usus amicoque  
 a puero est causaque mea permulta rogatus  
 fecit et incolumis laetor quod vivit in urbe.  
 Sed tamen admiror, quo pacto iudicium illud  
 100 fugerit.' Hic nigrae sucus loliginis, haec est  
 aerugo mera; quod vitium procul afore chartis  
 atque animo prius, ut siquid promittere de me  
 possum aliud, vere promitto.

As in the preceding Horace had contrasted an example of license of speech in private life with an innocent specimen of his

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*hic niger est*, and it would be easy, but superfluous to any one familiar with the vocabulary of the subject, to illustrate by examples the frequent association of this and similar words (*ater*, *lividus*, etc.) with the idea of satire. *Niger* is therefore a descriptive designation of the character which tradition had assigned to the satirist. Now just below, when Horace replies to his critic, he observes that at any dinner-table one may see a relentless wit, who, however, instead of earning reproach and censure, *tibi comis et urbanus liberque videtur* || *infesto nigris* (91). The words *tibi . . . infesto nigris* thus assign very definitely the preceding description to the critic. The plural number also reveals that it is as one of a class, and not as an individual, that the poet is exposed to the charge of malignity.

own personal satire, so here he contrasts the almost unconscious venom of his imaginary critic, the friend of Petillius, with the same illustration from his own work. 'If mention is made of Petillius Capitolinus, your friend and comrade, you betray him under the guise of friendship and good-will. Now, if my harmless allusion to Rufillus and Gargonius seemed to you a dark (*lividus*) and cutting (*mordax*) piece of malice, such treatment of your friend and companion is nothing less than blackness itself (*nigrae sucus lolliginis*) and pure corrosiveness (*aerugo mera*).<sup>1</sup>

Liberius si

dixero quid, si forte iocosus, hoc mihi iuris

105 cum venia dabis: insuevit pater optimus hoc me  
ut fugerem exemplis vitiorum quaeque notando.

The poet's revolt against classification with the traditional masters of satire is nowhere more direct than in these words. For Horace affirms that what little license of speech he may have been guilty of is not due to emulation of the spirit of Lucilius or Aristophanes, but to the homely habit inculcated by his good father. Whether Horace is quite sincere and whether imitation of Lucilius was not in truth the starting-point of his earliest work does not concern our present inquiry.<sup>2</sup> At all events, he now chooses to disavow any indebtedness which he may have owed to the literary tradition of satire. Accordingly, from this point on, he sets forth very briefly what we may call his programme. Like the preceding portion of the satire, it is put concretely, as a picture of his daily life and reflections, the product of his father's training.

Cum me hortaretur, parce frugaliter atque

viverem uti contentus eo quod mi ipse parasset,

' nonne vides, Albi ut male vivat filius utque

110 Baius inops? magnum documentum, ne patriam rem  
perdere quis velit; ' a turpi meretricis amore

<sup>1</sup> The observation that *nigrae sucus lolliginis* and *aerugo mera* are, so to speak, the superlative degrees of *lividus* and *mordax*, respectively, affords the connection between this example of the malice of everyday conversation and the specimen of the ὀνομαστὶ κομφοδεῖν from his own satire which Horace had instanced.

<sup>2</sup> Lucian Müller (Lucilius, Lips. 1872, p. 293), not recognizing the purpose of Horace's claim, says: "Etsi nihil laudi Horatii parentis velim detractum, non tamen potest negari Lucilium et ipsum propositis exemplis, quae ex principibus civitatis sive ex plebe pro arbitrio assumeret, vitiorum perversitatem sive foeditatem saepius demonstrasse."



- cum deterreret, 'Scetani dissimilis sis;'  
 ne sequerer moechas, concessa cum venere uti  
 possem, 'deprenti non bella est fama Treboni'  
 115 aiebat. 'Sapiens, vitatu quidque petitu  
 sit melius, causas reddet tibi; mi satis est, si  
 traditum ab antiquis morem servare tuamque,  
 dum custodis egres, vitam famamque tueri  
 incolumem possum, simul ac duraverit aetas  
 120 membra animumque tuum, nabis sine cortice.' Sic me  
 formabat puerum dictis et sive iubebat,  
 ut facerem quid, 'habes auctorem, quo facias hoc,'  
 unum ex iudicibus selectis obiciebat,  
 sive vetabat, 'an hoc inhonestum ac inutile factu  
 125 necne sit addubites, flagret rumore malo cum  
 hic atque ille?' Avidos vicinum funus ut aegros  
 exanimat mortisque metu se parcere cogit,  
 sic teneros animos aliena opprobria saepe  
 absterrent vitiis. Ex hoc ego sanus ab illis  
 130 perniciem quaecumque ferunt, mediocribus et quis  
 ignoscas vitiis teneor; fortassis et istinc  
 largiter abstulerit longa aetas, liber amicus,  
 consilium proprium, neque enim, cum lectulus aut me  
 porticus exceperit, desum mihi. 'Rectius hoc est;  
 135 hoc faciens vivam melius; sic dulcis amicis  
 occurram; hoc quidam non belle: numquid ego illi  
 imprudens olim faciam simile?' haec ego mecum  
 compressis agito labris; ubi quid datur oti,  
 inludo chartis. Hoc est mediocribus illis  
 140 ex vitiis unum; cui si concedere nolis,  
 multa poetarum veniet manus, auxilio quae  
 sit mihi—nam multo plures sumus—ac veluti te  
 Iudaei cogemus in hanc concedere turbam.

His writing, he implies, is merely the outgrowth of this habit, taught him by his father, of striving to correct his own faults by observing the foibles and vices of others. In this effort he is constantly employed, and with reflections on the conduct of others and their lessons for himself he busies himself at home and abroad. In the whole of this description there is a designed contrast to the rôle which tradition and literary criticism had attributed to the satirist. Against the personal criticism, the aggressiveness, the fondness for publicity,<sup>1</sup> and the malignant spirit which satire was supposed to display, he arrays his own ideal. He would not be a prosecutor of wrong even though there were rascals to bring to justice (70); the purpose of his

<sup>1</sup> In addition to vss. 37, 72 and 83, see also (for Lucilius) on I 10, 73.

writing, as of his living, is, not to correct the faults of others, but his own (106 ff.); he does not seek to hurt (78), nor to raise a coarse laugh at the expense of others (35 and 83), but to amuse and to entertain himself.<sup>1</sup> He asks not for a miscellaneous audience of the street-corners (38), the baths (75), or the book-shops (71), but is content with the ear of his friends (73 and I 10, 74 ff.).

It is a commonplace of criticism to say that the satire of Horace was of necessity excluded from many fields which Lucilius cultivated with vigor and success. This is usually attributed in no small degree to the restraints upon freedom of speech which the security of the new régime made necessary. But had all barriers to open criticism in public and private life been removed, we may, I believe, confidently assume that Horace would not have given expression to his satirical vein in a manner very different from that which he has employed. "The law-makers," says Aristotle, "prohibit certain forms of abusive language. They would perhaps have done well to prohibit some kinds of satirical jest (*σκόπτειν*) also. The gentleman, therefore, and the man of true refinement will be, so to speak, a law unto himself" (Eth. Nic. IV 14). Thus neither the difference between the social rank and the political influence of Lucilius and Horace, nor the additional restraints upon the expression of opinion in the time of Augustus conditioned the character of the Horatian satire. The poet had become a law unto himself. Thus, after a few tentative efforts in a more or less distinctly Lucilian manner, as it would seem, Horace early came into his own humane and kindly point of view. He found that if he would be understood and judged aright by his public, he must come to an open understanding with them concerning his relation to the history and character of the literary form which he professed. Accordingly in this work, early in his literary career, he seeks to make his position understood. He first shows that the preconception of the nature of satire which was generally entertained, and which was derived from one phase of the old comedy and from the practice of Lucilius, was narrow and entirely antipathetic to his nature. In the matter of form he disclaims all title to the name of poet, and therefore with open disavowal calls his satires conversations (*sermones*).<sup>2</sup> His own

<sup>1</sup> Cf. I 6, 122: *lecto aut scripto quod me tacitum iuvat*. See also I 10, 7-15.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the writer's article, 'Are the Letters of Horace Satires?', in vol. XVIII (1897), No. 2, of this Journal.

writing, he affirms, does not follow any famous models of free speech and licentious wit, but the homely practice of observation of life taught him by his father, and has for its aim his own improvement and amusement.

#### EXCURSUS ON PERSIUS AND THE THEORY OF SATIRE.

In the preceding interpretation the question may fairly be raised whether Horace had reflected deliberately on the nature of the jest suitable for the satirist to employ, and whether he has in mind the discussions of that subject which were to be found, presumably, in ethical and rhetorical treatises subsequent to Aristotle's treatment of the matter. In this excursus I would point out that the answer to this question may be facilitated by the consideration of two passages of Persius, which, on the one hand, are undoubtedly influenced by Horace, and, on the other, reveal distinct influence of philosophical theory in regard to the subject.

The first of these is from the fifth satire, vss. 17-20, which gives with rather surprising accuracy the essential content of the poem of Horace which we have been considering. For we saw that Horace makes twofold protest: (1) against the conception of satire as an elevated branch of poetry derived from the lofty manner of the old comedy, and (2) against the view that the satirist was privileged to employ a scurrilous and unbecoming license of jest and invective. The Horatian ideal of form Persius reproduces thus:

verba togae sequeris iunctura callidis acri  
ore teres modico—

Horace's attitude toward the content and spirit of satire is expressed in the words which follow:

pallentis radere mores  
doctus et ingenuo culpam defigere ludo.

If the phrase *verba togae* contains any allusion to the *fabula togata* (Conington, Gildersleeve), which I doubt, it is only for the purpose of associating the language of satire with that of comedy, as Horace does—*sermoni propiora, sermo merus*. On *ore modico* a word presently. But this does not advance us beyond Horace. In the expression *ingenuo culpam defigere ludo*, however, Persius interprets for us Horace's attitude of hostility toward the harsh

and scurrilous wit of Lucilius by a technical term, or the reflection of a technical term, which reveals that Persius, at all events, has in mind the theoretical standpoint which I have suggested may lie behind the words of Horace. Conington compares the πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις of Aristotle (Rhet. II 12, 10). But the real Aristotelian parallel is found in Eth. IV 14 (1128a20): καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου παιδιὰ (*ingenuus ludus*) διαφέρει τῆς τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους κτλ. The man who observes consistently the proper limits in this respect is the ἐπιδέξιος, and ἐπιδεξιότης is a quality of the mean or ideal: τῇ μέσῃ δ' ἔξει οἰκείον καὶ ἡ ἐπιδεξιότης ἐστίν (ib.). The *ingenuus ludus*, the jest of a gentleman, is then the Aristotelian mean of εὐτραπεία, removed from boorishness (ἀγροικία), which is the ἑλλειψις, and from scurrility (βωμολοχία), which is the ὑπερβολή. I call attention to this because it adds some light to the tortuous expression *ore teres modico*, which seems not to have been fully understood. We saw that Horace, in contrasting the nature of true poetry with his own prosaic *sermones*, described the former as *os magna sonaturum*. To emphasize the contrast Horace goes far when he implies by comparison that satire is *sermo merus*—farther than Persius is willing to follow him. For he puts over against *os magna sonaturum* not the extreme antithesis which Horace named *sermo merus*, but *ore teres modico*. That is, as the content of satire should reveal a spirit of *ingenuus ludus* which we have found to be the Aristotelian mean, so in language it should occupy the mean between elevated poetical style and prose, viz. *ore teres modico*.<sup>1</sup>

But, although the full meaning of Persius only appears by comparison with Aristotle, it would be wrong to conclude that Persius is directly indebted to him. This appears from the radical difference between them in their attitude toward the old comedy. To Aristotle, as is well known, the old comedy afforded the most conspicuous illustrations of illiberal jest. For, after pointing out that there is a difference between the servile and the liberal, the uncultivated and the cultivated forms of wit, he continues (l. c.): ἴδοι ἄν τις καὶ ἐκ τῶν κωμωδιῶν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν καινῶν τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἦν γελοῖον ἢ αἰσχρολογία, τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπόνοια. It is

<sup>1</sup> The extremes in relation to which these words are the mean, are given by Horace in A. P., vss. 94 and 95:

Iratusque Chremes tumido delitigat ore,  
Et tragicus plerumque dolet sermone pedestri  
etc.

therefore a matter of some surprise that Persius, in another passage which touches on the legitimate and becoming forms of jest, makes the three masters of old comedy ideal representatives of the true satirical spirit. It is the well-known place in the first satire in which he tells for whom he writes.

- Audaci quicumque adflate Cratino  
Iratum Eupolidem praegrandi cum sene palles
- 125 Aspice et haec, si forte aliquid decoctius audis.  
Inde vaporata lector mihi ferveat aure :  
Non hic qui in crepidas Graiorum ludere gestit.  
Sordidus, et lusco qui possit dicere 'lusce,'  
Sese aliquem credens, Italo quod honore supinus
- 130 Fregerit eminas Arreti aedilis iniquas ;  
Nec qui abaco numeros et secto in pulvere metas  
Scit risisse vafer, multum gaudere paratus,  
Si cynico barbam petulans nonaria vellat.

Those who come with taste purified by the study of these famous masters of Attic wit shall be his audience, not the sordid philistine who expects low jibes at the slippered Greeks, nor the man whose own sense of wit does not rise above the personal abuse which finds an object of laughter in some physical defect or deformity<sup>1</sup>; nor, again, those who find in ridicule of philosophy and personal indignities offered to its votaries fit subject for merriment. The doctrine of this passage is Aristotelian, as the editors point out, quoting *Eth. Nic. III 7 (1114a24)*: τοῖς μὲν διὰ φύσιν αἰσχροῖς οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾷ. It should be noted also that the example is Aristotelian: οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ὀνειδίσσειε τυφλῷ φύσει κτλ. (ib.).

We see thus that, although Persius here and in 5, 17 ff. follows the Aristotelian teaching in regard to the becoming form of jest, he does not share Aristotle's feeling toward the old comedy. On the contrary, it represents to him the purest type of legitimate satire (*inde vaporata aure*). But it is not impossible to parallel, and so in a measure to explain, the apparent anomaly that he instances as his ideal of satire exactly that literature to which Aristotle had referred to illustrate the violation of the very principles which Persius advocates. I have already called atten-

<sup>1</sup> Vss. 129 and 130 seem to be a rather meaningless digression, and owe their origin, apparently, to the effervescent facility of Persius in Horatian reminiscence. For the words *lusco possit dicere lusce* carried him back to the swaggering praetor of Fundi, Aufidius Luscus (*Serm. I 5, 34*). I doubt if they have any bearing on the point that Persius is urging, unless, possibly, it be to characterize such personal jest as provincial, still bearing the *vestigia ruris*.

tion to the fact that Aristotle's condemnation of old comedy did not prevail generally among later theorists and critics. It was a product so vital and vigorous as to survive the sentence even of the Stagyrite. Plutarch, to be sure, is animated with the same spirit of hostility in his Comparison of Aristophanes and Menander (cf. also Συμποσιακά, VII 8); but for the most part subsequent literary criticism attributed to the old comedy not only an aggressive scurrility, but also a pleasing and liberal spirit of jest. Evidence on this point might be accumulated from the treatises περὶ κωμωδίας and other sources, but a single quotation from Platonius π. κωμ. II (Dübner), characterizing Aristophanes, will suffice: ἔχει πρὸς τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας τὸ σφοδρὸν τοῦ Κρατίνου καὶ τὸ τῆς ἐπιτρεχούσης χάριτος Εὐπόλιδος. From such criticism was developed the general formulation of comic theory: ἴδιον δὲ κωμωδίας τὸ μεμιγμένον ἔχειν τοῖς σκώμμασι (= τὸ σφοδρὸν) γέλωτα (= ἡ χάρις).<sup>1</sup> But the most striking illustration of this estimate of the old comedy, so different from Aristotle's, is found in a passage of Cicero, which affords a close parallel to Persius. In De officiis, I 104, Cicero says: *duplex omnino est iocandi genus: unum inliberale petulans flagitiosum obscenum, alterum elegans urbanum ingeniosum facetum. quo genere non modo Plautus noster et Atticorum antiqua comoedia, sed etiam philosophorum Socraticorum libri referti sunt.* This certainly is remarkable, in view of the fact that Aristotle, whose language in characterization of the two kinds of jest, is here reproduced, had said of the writers of old comedy: τοῖς μὲν ἦν γελοῖον ἢ αἰσχρολογία. One is compelled to wonder, as in the case of Persius, whether Cicero speaks from his own knowledge of the old comedy, or whether he is not reproducing the judgment of some one else. For it is true that almost any comedy of Aristophanes would have afforded Cicero specimens of wit in plenty which he must have condemned by his own standards, in which (l. c.) *rerum turpitudini adhibetur verborum obscenitas* (αἰσχρολογία). Another passage illustrative of the same point of view, from Horace, Serm. I 10, 16, will be taken up in its place.

In conclusion it should be noticed that Persius does not group Lucilius with the masters of old comedy as a representative of the ideal spirit of satire. His only characterization of him describes the vehemence of his invective and attack (I 114):

<sup>1</sup> For other illustrations see A. J. P., vol. XV, p. 13, note 2.

secuit Lucilius urbem  
Te Lupe, te Muci, et genuinum fregit in illis.

It would not do, however, to say that these words imply criticism of Lucilius, for a skillful use of the aggressive and vehement in satire was in itself ground for praise, as Horace says: *at idem quod sale multo || urbem defricuit, charta laudatur eadem*. But no one can doubt that the characterization of Horace which follows:

Omne vafer vitium ridenti Flaccus amico  
Tangit et admissus circum praeordia ludit  
etc.

is drawn with more sympathetic feeling. Together the descriptions of Lucilius and Horace make up the ideal of satire; and just as Aristophanes, in the passage of Platonius quoted above, was said to combine the vehemence of Cratinus and the charm of Eupolis, so Lucilius is the type of τὸ σφοδρόν and Horace of ἡ χάρις.

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